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INTRODUCTION
In June and July of 1981, the first reports of a new immune deficiency
syndrome, now known as the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and
the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), were described in
homosexual men in New York City, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.' By
1983, scientists had isolated the cause: the human retrovirus, HIV-1.2
Within a few years, the modes of transmission were identified as sexual
contact, the sharing of contaminated blood, and from mother to baby, either
in utero or through breast-feeding.
3
The pathogenesis of HIV/AIDS was discovered to involve the infection
and eventual destruction of helper T-cells, a cell sometimes referred to as the
"traffic cop" because it directs immune responses against germs, cancer,
transplanted organs, and foreign bodies.4 By destroying these cells, HIV
leads to the progressive deterioration of the immune system, resulting in
susceptibility to myriad opportunistic infections and cancers that define the
syndrome known as AIDS and lead to death, in the vast majority of
HIV/AIDS infected persons, within eight to ten years.5 Drugs directed at
crippling the virus by blocking its reproduction within infected cells, known
as anti-retroviral therapies (ARTs), were quickly developed after the
discovery of HIV/AIDS, and within a decade, these drugs dramatically
changed the disease from a certain killer to a chronic disease that could be
managed for years. 6 But neither these drugs, nor any other intervention
currently available, can cure this viral infection. 7 In other words, once an
individual is infected with HIV/AIDS, with our currently available
treatments, they will always be infected.8
1. GERALD L. MANDELL ET AL., MANDELL, DOUGLAS, AND BENNETT'S PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1635 (7th ed. 2010).
2. Id. at 1645-49.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1687.
5. Id. at 1706-08.
6. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 1833.
7. Id. at 1849.
8. Id.
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Despite modem medicines that offer infected patients marked
prolongation of life, HIV/AIDS continues to rage on.9 Today, over thirty-
three million people-nearly half-a-percent of the world's population-are
infected. 10 Worldwide, there are approximately five million new infections
and over two million HIV/AIDS-related deaths each year." Over two-thirds
of these infections and deaths occur in sub-Saharan Africa, 12 while in the
United States, there are approximately 1.2 million persons currently living
with HIV/AIDS, with roughly 55,000 new infections diagnosed each year.
In brief, HIV/AIDS is a lifelong disease that can be sexually-transmitted,
transmitted through contact with contaminated blood, or transferred from
mother to child during pregnancy. 14  Today, treatment with ARTs has
dramatically changed the prognosis from sure death to the likelihood of a
prolonged, nearly normal life. 15  The pandemic continues to expand
worldwide and in the United States, however, affecting the social fabric,
economic stability, and political environment of communities, especially in
high-prevalence countries. As a result, emphasizing a reflexive response
after people are infected is much less effective at reducing the incidence of
new cases than implementing comprehensive prevention methods (even if
9. CDC, HHS, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP.: CASES OF HIV INFECTION & AIDS IN
THE UNITED STATES & DEPENDENT AREAS (2007) [hereinafter HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE
REPORT]; see generally Wafaa M. EI-Sadr et al., AIDS in America - Forgotten but Not
Gone, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Feb. 10, 2010), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content
/full/NEJMp1000069v1.
10. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 1619; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. & WORLD
POPULATION CLOCKS, http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited
April 18, 2010).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1620.
13. HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 9.
14. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 1488.
15. Ard van Sighem et al., Life Expectancy of Recently Diagnosed Asymptomatic
HIV-infected Patients Approaches that of Uninfected Individuals, Paper 526 (Conference
on Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections 2010); Charlotte Lewden, Time with CD4
Cell Count above 500 cells/mm3 Allows HIV-infected Men, but Not Women, to Reach
Similar Mortality Rates to Those of the General Population: A 7-year Analysis, Paper
527 (Conference on Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections 2010).
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they are not one-hundred percent effective) that block infection before the
infection occurs. Recognizing the need for more effective preventive
methods, the Ryan White Care Act funds treatment for those infected with
HIV/AIDS as part of a federal effort to deal with the burgeoning crisis.,
6
While this legislation provides the largest single grant of money for
HIV/AIDS research, 17 its fundamental weakness is that it does not make
funds uniformly available to all those infected with HIV/AIDS.
18
Historically, there is another disease whose impact and progression was
eerily similar to HIV/AIDS: syphilis. Before the advent of curative
penicillin treatment in the 1940s, between eight and fourteen percent of
adults living in major cities of the United States and Western Europe were
infected with syphilis. 19 At that time, ten to twelve percent of cardiovascular
disease,20 many fetal deaths,2' and ten percent of cases of adult mental
illness were attributed to syphilis.22 Like AIDS, syphilis had a direct and
extensive impact on public health. The mode of transmission for syphilis
also is the same as HIV/AIDS-sexual intercourse, contaminated blood, and
mother-to-child.23  Because the two diseases have nearly identical
epidemiological parallels, public health professionals should apply the
lessons learned in the battle to control syphilis to the present fight against
HIV/AIDS, thereby reducing the incidence of new HIV/AIDS cases until a
vaccine is developed.
16. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576, 579.
17. HEALTH RES. AND SERV. ADMIN., HHS, THE HIV/AIDS PROGRAM: FUNDING,
available at http://hab.hrsa.gov/reports/funding.htm (last visited April 9, 2010).
18. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576, 586-89; see also Posting of Mary Wakefield to
blog.AIDS.gov, Responding to Concerns Over Ryan White Emergency Housing Policy,
http://blog.aids.gov/2010/02/responding-to-concems-over-ryan-white-emergency-
housing-policy.html (Feb. 11, 2010).
19. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 2769, 3036.
20. THOMAS PARRAN, JR., SHADOW ON THE LAND 17 (1937).
21. Id. at21.
22. Id. at 18-21.
23. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 3036.
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This Article proposes a new public policy approach to HIV/AIDS
modeled after the federal government's response to syphilis in the 1930s and
1940s. Section I examines the public health response to syphilis and
concludes that its success was due to a three-prong approach that
emphasized broad testing, universal treatment, and comprehensive
education. Section II discusses the current HIV/AIDS crisis and explains
why a plan of action modeled after the public health response to syphilis
would effectively blunt the transmission and public health problem posed by
HIV/AIDS. Section III analyzes the legal implications of this proposal,
examining the competing interests of personal privacy and government
action. Section IV addresses some pragmatic issues related to this proposal,
postulating the most effective means of accomplishing and funding these
recommendations. Section V concludes with a recapitulation of the dire
situation posed by HIV/AIDS, the inadequacy of the current public health
response to this disease, and the need for a test-treat-educate solution
modeled after the response to syphilis in the twentieth century.
I. THE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE To SYPHILIS
In the pre-antibiotic era before 1945, the public health response to syphilis
was driven principally by the United States Surgeon General, Thomas
Parran, Jr. 24  When Parran began serving as Surgeon General in 1936,
syphilis was at the height of its prevalence, and there were few treatment
options, all of which had serious side effects.25 Parran advocated for a new
public health response to syphilis, the basic tenets of which can be
summarized as follows: early diagnosis, widespread treatment, and
comprehensive education of both medical professionals and the lay
public.26,
27
24. PARRAN, supra note 20.
25. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 3036.
26. N.R. INGRAHAM, JR., SPIROCHAETA PALLIDA AND THE ETIOLOGY OF SYPHILIS
(Publication No. 6, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1938).
27. Parran summarized his philosophy on the treatment of syphilis thus:
No matter how excellent the alibis for the little that we have done to control
syphilis, nobody denies that it can be done. Great as are the unsolved scientific
problems of syphilis, desirable as it would be to discover swifter, less
complicated, less costly methods of cure, nevertheless we know enough now to
save the victim and the society which is burdened by him .... First, every early
case must be located, reported, its source ascertained, and all contacts followed
up to find possible infection. Second, enough money, drugs, and doctors must
be secured to make treatment possible in all cases; it is not in the public interest
2010
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The first step in Parran's plan involved locating, reporting, and
ascertaining the source of infection for every case of syphilis, in order to
track, diagnose, and treat all cases of syphilis. 28 To do this effectively,
Parran proposed that a syphilis test be conducted whenever a patient had
contact with the medical profession, including at admission to the hospital,
when applying for a job in public service or in the private sector, when
applying for insurance, when applying for a marriage license, or during any
interaction with law enforcement. 29 To cover the costs of testing, Parran
proposed government support and successfully pushed for finding in the
Social Security Act of 1935 and the National Venereal Disease Control Act
of 1938. 30 Armed with these laws, universal testing became the norm.
3 1
Under the Social Security Act of 1935, Congress allocated millions of
dollars each year (as adjusted for inflation) 32 for testing to diagnose cases of
syphilis and other sexually transmitted diseases.33 The National Venereal
for treatment, which is our most practical means of control, to be retarded or
precluded by cost. Third, both public health agencies and private physicians
throughout the country must be realigned to form a united front and re-educated
to use modem methods in their joint fight against syphilis. In addition, citizens
must be informed as to the means and methods required for individual and
public protection . . . Zealot though I may be concerning the advantages of
universal blood testing, I realize it is not practical to set up the machinery for
tests on the whole population. The next best thing is make a blood test
whenever and wherever physical examinations are given, as routinely as the
doctor now takes pulse and blood pressure and listens to the heart action.
PARRAN, supra note 20, at 246-49.
28. PARRAN, supra note 20, at 247.
29. Id.
30. Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620 (1935); National Venereal Disease
Control Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 439 (1938).
31. Raymond A. Vonderlehr & Lida J. Usilton, The Extent of the Syphilis Problem at
the Beginning of World War II, 43 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 1825 (1943).
32. The Social Security Act of 1935 allocated $2,000,000 for disease testing. Social
Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, 635 (1935). Adjusting for inflation, this is
approximately $32,000,000 in 2010 dollars. See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.
requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last visited April 18, 2010).
33. Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, 635 (1935).
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Disease Control Act of 1938 also appropriated huge sums of money for the
research, study, testing, and treatment of syphilis and other venereal
diseases.34 Additionally, this Act vested the Surgeon General with the
authority to "allot such sum to the several States upon the basis of (1) the
population, (2) the extent of the venereal-disease problem, and (3) the
financial needs of the respective States." 35 Armed with these funds, many
state health departments soon began providing test kits and performing the
tests at no expense to the patient or the practitioner.36
To ensure widespread treatment, the second step in Parran's plan, he
proposed that the government provide enough funding so that all who were
infected could be treated.37 Parran wrote that "it is not in the public interest
for treatment, which is our most practical means of control, to be retarded or
precluded by cost."38 In other words, treating all patients was in the interest
of everyone's individual health and in the interest of the general public's
health. 39 Furthermore, effective treatment reduces the circulating viral load
in the patient, rendering the patient significantly less likely to infect his or
her sexual partner.40  To gain the far reaching public support needed to
underpin the acceptance of these intrusive, interventional steps, Parran
proposed the third element of his plan-the need to educate all sectors of
society about: (1) the reasons for testing and treating syphilis; (2) the
34. National Venereal Disease Control Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 439 (1938).
35. Id.
36. At this early date, the federal government did not keep records with sufficient
detail to note conclusively the extent to which states took such actions. Furthermore, this
type of information is not the sort that is even likely to have been published.
Nevertheless, by examining the current practices and the little historical data that actually
exists and by noting the mere existence of this statutory funding, it can be surmised that
such funds were utilized in this manner; see U.S. Preventive Serv. Task Force, HHS,
Screening for Syphilis Infection, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/3rduspstf
/syphilis/syphilrs.htm (last visited April 9, 2010).
37. PARRAN, supra note 20, at 259.
38. Id. at 247.
39. Id.
40. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 1650-53.
2010
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methods used to diagnose and treat the disease; and (3) the means b which
people could protect themselves to help retard disease transmission.
Of note, one of the major accomplishments of the near universal testing
for syphilis was that it identified the vast majority of infected individuals for
follow-up treatment with penicillin, an antibiotic discovered in 1928-and
widely available by the end of the 1940s-that cures syphilis and helped
42drive down the prevalence of the disease. Indeed, the decrease in the
prevalence of syphilis that resulted from Parran's method of testing,
treatment, and education was astounding, with cases falling from a peak of
580,000 cases in the United States in 1942 to 120,000 cases ten years later,
to 50,000 cases in 2002, in spite of the doubling of the U.S. population.43
II. WHY THE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO HIV/AIDS SHOULD BE
PATTERNED AFTER THE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO SYPHILIS
The major impediment to implementing a comprehensive, strategic public
health response to HIV/AIDS has been the inability to foster early diagnosis
and treatment. Although the federal government, under the Ryan White Act,
and the states, under Medicaid, underwrite treatment of HIV/AIDS for the
poor and uninsured patients, neither federal or state action address universal
testing.44 For universal testing to become accepted and widespread, one
cannot rely on private insurance to fill the gap between funding treatment
and funding testing.45 This is especially true when the financial obligation
of early diagnosis and treatment becomes a substantial burden on insurance
companies by making coverage of costly and frequent medical visits,
frequent tests, and expensive treatments their responsibility.
41. PARRAN, supra note 20, at 262.
42. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 281, 2769.
43. Id. at 3037; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION ESTIMATES (Oct. 1, 2004),
available at http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/pre- 1980/PE- 11-1 940s.pdf; U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION ESTIMATES (Dec. 31, 2002) available at
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/20OOs/vintage_2002/files/NA-EST2002-O 1 .pdf.
44. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576, 579; Jennifer Kates, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, MEDICAID AND HIV/AIDS (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found.,
Washington, D.C., Oct. 2006), at 1, available at http://www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/7172-
03.pdf.
45. Id.
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Another impediment to introducing a comprehensive public health
response to HIV/AIDS, similar to Parran's approach to syphilis in the 1930s
• • 46
and 1940s, is the recent rise of individual privacy-rights policies. Coupled
with the stigmatism that often goes along with being infected with
HIV/AIDS, and the weak laws intended to protect infected people from
discrimination, public health priorities have been hampered by the
increasingly litigious issue of personal privacy and autonomy.
Nevertheless, in 2003, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), an agency within the United States Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), took the fist step toward wide-scale testing, when it
recommended routine "opt-out" HIV testing in all health care settings, in
place of the existing pretest permission requirement. 4 8 Opt-out screening
involves notifying patients over thirteen years of age that an HIV test will be
performed and offering the patient the opportunity to decline or defer
testing.49 Appropriately applied in emergency rooms, during doctor and
clinic visits, and upon hospital admissions, this approach could identify an
increased number of infected individuals, provide better counseling and
treatment to these patients, and markedly reduce the rate of transmission of
HIV/AIDS.5°  Unfortunately, opt-out testing has not been widely
implemented. 5'
46. See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
P.L.104-191 (1996).
47. Id.
48. CDC, HHS, ADVANCING HIV PREVENTION: NEW STRATEGIES FOR A CHANGING
EPIDEMIC 329 (2003) [hereinafter HIV PREVENTION].
49. LouiSA E. CHAPMAN ET AL., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, "Recommendations for Postexposure
Interventions to Prevent Infection," 9, vol. 57, no. RR-6 (Aug. 1, 2008).
50. HIV PREVENTION, supra note 48, at 329.
51. This information can be deduced from the marginal increase in screening tests.
CDC has no direct information on the extent to which states have implemented opt-out
testing. Nevertheless, CDC can deduce that opt-out testing has not enjoyed wide
implementation given the nature of what cases are reported. For instance, testing in
Washington, D.C. has been high in recent years given the increased press and
government attention to the problem of HIV/AIDS in that area. Conversely, testing in
Little Rock, Arkansas, for example, is extremely low, because the HIV/AIDS problem in
that area receives little national attention, comparatively. Telephone interviews and
personal conversations with CDC officials, Bethesda, Md. (February to April 2010).
2010
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Although the present day treatment for HIV/AIDS does not cure the
infection, the impacts of anti-retroviral therapy and other treatments have
been dramatic. 52 Not only do these treatments prolong the expected lifespan
of infected individuals,53 the treatments reduce the transmission of HIV from
an infected mother to her baby by almost one-hundred percent, and between
intimate partners by approximately eighty to one-hundred percent. 54 Simply
stated, effective treatment is, in and of itself, an extraordinary means of
preventing transmission from one infected person to another. Moreover,
interaction with appropriately motivated medical personnel would
emphasize and encourage the implementation of other preventive measures,
such as abstinence, monogamy, male circumcision, condom use, microbicide
use, the prevention and treatment of drug and alcohol abuse, and the
treatment of other sexually transmitted diseases.
55
A comprehensive educational program that is widely available and
consistently communicated would result in decreased stigmatization, greater
acceptance of infected individuals, and the political will to fund a
comprehensive public health response that emphasizes diagnosis, treatment,
and education. This kind of educational program would also further a
general understanding that it is in the interest of every member of society to
reduce the overall incidence of HIV/AIDS.57 This education must occur in
two stages. First, the education program must focus on infected individuals,
52. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 1833.
53. SIGHEM, supra note 15, at 1;LEWDEN, supra note 15, at 1.
54. Patrick Sullivan et al., Reduction of HIV Transmission Risk and High Risk Sex
while Prescribed ART: Results from Discordant Couples in Rwanda -and Zambia, Paper
52bLB (Conference on Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections, 2009); Furthermore,
three recent modeling studies support this test-treat-educate approach. See R.M. Granich
et al., Universal Voluntary HIV Testing with Immediate Antiretroviral Therapy as a
Strategy for Elimination of HIV Transmission: A Mathematical Model, 48 LANCET 373
(2009); see also Bradley G. Wagner & Sally Blower, Voluntary Universal Testing and
Treatment is Unlikely to Lead to HIV Elimination: A Modeling Analysis, NATURE
PROCEEDINGS, 29 October 2009.
55. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 1650-54.
56. See LAWRENCE 0. GosTN & ZITA LAZZARINI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC
HEALTH IN THE AIDS PANDEMIC 69-75 (1997) (emphasizing the importance of a
comprehensive education program in preventing HIV/AIDS).
57. Id.
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providing them with the knowledge necessary for their psychological
support and equipping them with information so they can avoid transmitting
the disease to others. Second, the general public must also be educated
about HIV/AIDS prevention methods. All prevention methods, including
abstinence, monogamy, condom use, anti-retroviral treatment, and
microbicide use, to name just a few, require a decision by the individual.
For some prevention methods, the individual needs to make the decision to
use the preventative measure only once. Vaccine use (if one were available
for HIV) and male circumcision would fall into this category. Because the
preventative decision needs to be made only once with vaccines, it has led to
the successful reduction of other communicable diseases, such as polio and
measles. 58  On the other hand, some prevention methods require the
individual to make this decision repeatedly. Condom use, abstinence, and
monogamy are three prevention methods where the individual must
repeatedly decide to take preventative action with each encounter. It is at
this stage that prevention education begins to crumble-requiring repeated
individual decision-making is difficult to maintain. For this reason, the
ability of education to influence repeated individual decision-making
requires repetitive and redundant exposure to accurate information, or the
education program can lose effectiveness. While there will always be some
individuals who are uneducable, the comprehensive education program
described here is integral to a successful response to HIV/AIDS.59
In short, learning from the past and implementing a comprehensive public
health approach patterned after the successful response to syphilis in the
1930s and 1940s would reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS in any country
where such a program is implemented. By diagnosing infected persons
through a widespread testing network, public health officials can implement
early treatment and provide counseling to affect responsible behavior. These
efforts would reduce transmission rates and blunt the deleterious public
health effects of HIV/AIDS.
60
58. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 2031, 2141.
59. As Richard Posner has noted, "most people are ignorant about most matters."
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 112 (1990); see generally SUSAN
JACOBY, THE AGE OF AMERICAN UNREASON (2008). This does not mean that all
education efforts are doomed, however. Just because some individuals will simply
choose not to act on their knowledge, this is no reason not to implement an education
program focused on equipping as many as possible-most of whom will act on their new-
found understanding.
60. At the 17th annual Conference on Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections
(CROI) in February of this year, Dr. Moupali Das-Douglas, of the San Francisco
Department of Public Health, presented a paper concluding that HIV incidence rates can
2010
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be meaningfully reduced through the widespread use of ARTs. Moupali Das-Douglas et
al., Decreases in Community Viral Load Are Associated with a Reduction in New HIV
Diagnoses in San Francisco, Paper 33 (Conference on Retroviruses and Opportunistic
Infections 2010). Since then, many news sources and magazines have touted the use of
ARTs as the solution to the AIDS crisis, claiming that the use of such therapies could
eliminate AIDS within thirty or forty years. See Jessica Berman, Plan Would Eliminate
AIDS/HIV Within 30 Years, VOANEWS.COM, Feb. 24, 2010, http://wwwl.
voanews.com/english/news/health/Plan-Would-Eliminate-AIDSHIV-within-30-Years-
85222292.html; Ian Sample, Blanket HIV testing 'could see Aids dying out in 40 years',
GUARDIAN, Feb. 22, 2010, at 1 available at http://www.guardian.co.uk
/world/2010/feb/21/blanket-testing-hiv-aids; Steve Connor, Aids: is the end in sight? THE
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 22, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/science/aids-is-the-end-in-sight-I 906467.html. Taking a broader, more generalized
view of the problem, Dr. Deborah Donnell, of the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research
Center, also presented a paper at CROI this year, arguing that HIV/AIDS rates can be
drastically reduced through a widespread testing and treatment plan. Deborah Donnell et
al., ART and Risk of Heterosexual HIV-1 Transmission in HIV-1 Serodiscordant African
Couples: A Multinational Prospective Study, Paper 136 (Conference on Retroviruses and
Opportunistic Infections, 2010). Her conclusions have also garnered significant press,
with many magazines and news outlets postulating that this idea, which incorporates an
aggressive use of ARTs in treating HIV/AIDS, may drastically cut down on the
transmission and incidence rates of the diseases. See Loretta McLaughlin, A 'test
and treat'approach to fighting HIV, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2010, at 17 , available
at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ editorialopinion/oped/articles/2010/02/26/a test
and treat approach to-fighting_hiv/; Deirdre Shesgreen, More Evidence That ART Is
Treatment & Prevention, SCIENCE SPEAKS: HIV & TB NEWS, Feb. 20, 2010,
http://sciencespeaks.wordpress.com/2010/02/20/more-evidence-that-art-is-treatment-
prevention/; Global HIV/AIDS news and analysis, SOUTH AFRICA: New research fuels
"test and treat" debate, PLUSNEWS, Feb. 22, 2010, http://www.plusnews.
org/report.aspx?ReportlD=88200; Ed Susman, Antiretroviral Therapy Can Reduce Risk
of HIV Transmission to Uninfected Sexual Partners: Presented at CROI, DGDISPATCH,
Feb. 19, 2010, http://nuvisworldwide.com /news/content.nsf/MedicalNews/85257
6140048867C852576CF006E6E3E?OpenDocument&id=FEAAC2EFB4EBFD3785256
D9E004FE339; Crystal Phend, CRO: Couples Strategy Cuts HIV Transmission,
MEDPAGE TODAY, Feb. 18, 2010, http://www. medpagetoday.com/MeetingCoverage/
CRO18541; Erika Check Hayden, 'Seek, test and treat' slows HIV, NATURE 463
(7284):1006 (2010), available at http://www.nature.com/news/2010/240210/full!
4631006a.html. One critical step that none of the position papers or news articles reach,
however, is the pragmatic consideration of how to actually establish such a scheme at the
national level. Such is the aim of this Article.
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III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE-
THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND STATE ACTION
The problem of HIV/AIDS, and the solution this article proposes, pose
some provocative legal questions. Foremost among them is the issue of
individual privacy rights and how this interest relates to the government's
duty to protect the public health. As appealing as this proposed solution
may sound, in theory, if its necessary elements cannot be legally sustained,
then this solution is no more valuable than a stimulating mental exercise.
Would the privacy rights of individuals be violated by testing all those
admitted to emergency rooms, seeking life and health insurance, or
undergoing a physical examination prior to employment? How far can the
government go in order to protect the health and welfare of the American
populace?
In order for the government to effectively protect public health, it needs
accurate, comprehensive, and current information. At times, this need can
compete with the interests of private individuals to their privacy and
62autonomy. As the Supreme Court of the United States noted in Katz v.
United States, "[v]irtually every governmental action interferes with
personal privacy to some degree. The question in each case is whether that
interference violates a command of the United States Constitution." 63 This
section will analyze the constitutional rights of individuals as it relates to
government action in the area of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment.
64
61. KENNETH R. WING ET AL., PUBLic HEALTH LAW 280 (2007).
62. Id.
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967); see also WtNG, supra note
61, at 284 (stating that "[t]he threshold legal question in surveillance is whether the state
can compel information to be reported without the consent of the person the information
is about... or the person holding the information").
64. The solution proposed in this Article would place the onus on the government,
either federal or state, to mandate and fund testing, treatment, and education for
HIV/AIDS. As a result, this solution does not place additional requirements on
physicians or other hospital staff, aside from the mere administration of these tests and
treatments. This proposed solution places no additional medical malpractice
considerations on physicians and medical personnel. While tests and treatments may be
administered by private physicians contracting with the government, the testing and
treatment recommended in this Article would be mandated, funded, and supervised by the
government, not by private physicians. While normal medical negligence standards will
still apply to all aspects of the testing and treatment proposed here, this solution is
accomplished through government action, not through the unitary acts of private
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A. Individual Privacy Rights
This discussion of individual privacy rights will provide an overview of
the constitutional right to privacy and then examine the law relevant to
specific privacy rights regarding medical information and testing. Courts
have recognized that individuals have a constitutional right to privacy over
their personal information and their autonomy. 65  Personal medical
information is constitutionally protected under this right to privacy.
66
Although courts have found that the government may infringe upon this
right, such government action is subject to a heightened level of
constitutional scrutiny.
67
The United States Constitution does not explicitly mention privacy
rights.68  Nevertheless, since the late-1800s the Supreme Court has
recognized that the Constitution does contain an individual right to
privacy.6 9 This right is present in the First Amendment, according to Stanley
v. Georgia,70 in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, according to Terry v.
Ohio,7 1 in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights and in the Ninth Amendment,
according to Griswold v. Connecticut,72 and in the Fourteenth Amendment,
physicians on their own. Consequently, medical malpractice liabilities are neither
heightened nor lessened by the proposed solution laid out in this Article.
65. Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 806 (5th Cir. 1996).
66. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80-81 (1976).
67. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 766-
68 (1986).
68. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (holding modified by Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)) (stating that "[t]he Constitution
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy"); Carey v. Population Serv., Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 684 (1977).
69. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891)).
70. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
71. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).
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according to Meyer v. Nebraska.73  Citing precedent in Palko v.
Connecticut,7 4 which referenced each of these cases, the Court in Roe v.
Wade similarly stated, "[t]hese decisions make it clear that only personal
rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.
7 5
Generally, there are two categories of constitutional privacy rights: (1)
informational privacy, where individuals have a right against the misuse of
their personal information by the government; and, (2) autonomy privacy,
where individuals have a right to make intimate decisions without
government interference. 76  An individual's interest in protecting their
medical information would fall under the category of informational
77 78privacy. This interest is twofold. Privacy interests in information are
implicated both when the government collects and stores information, as
well as when the government releases that information to the public.
79
Although the constitutional right to privacy recognized by the Supreme
Court creates a threshold below which any government action would be
unconstitutional, states are free to enact their own privacy protections above
this constitutional minimum. Many states have done so, expressly
recognizing a zone of privacy rights beyond the guarantees in the United
States Constitution. One reason many state constitutions provide
73. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
74. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
75. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)) (internal citations omitted).
76. Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 806 (5th Cir. 1996).
77. Nelson v. Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 530 F.3d 865, 877-78 (9th Cir.
2008).
78. In re Rausch, 197 B.R. 109, 115 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996), aff'd, 213 B.R. 364 (D.
Nev. 1997), and aff'd, 194 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999).
79. Id.
80. See State v. Mariano, 160 P.3d 1258, 1268 (Haw. Ct. App. 2007); WING, supra
note 61, at 286.
81. See People v. Givens, 892 N.E.2d 1098, 1107 (111. 1st Dist. 2008); State v.
Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 581 (Alaska 2007); State v. Ellis, 210 P.3d
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heightened protection of individual privacy rights is due to the fact that the
American system of federalism allows most government interaction with
individuals to occur at the state and local level.8
In addition to the general constitutional protections of individual privacy,
there are several specific statutes and regulations, as well as case law, that
protect personal privacy specifically with regard to medical information,
testing, and treatment. 8 Because there is no single, overarching statute
governing medical privacy, the law on this subject must be pieced together
from various sources. 84 The following list of federal statutes all speak to the
issue of medical privacy rights: the Privacy Act of 1974,5 the Computer
Matching and Privacy Protections Act, 86 the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act,87 the Freedom of Information Act, the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act,89 the Health Research Extension Act, the Public Health
Service Act, 91 and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
92
144, 148 (Montana 2009); In re Carmen M., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 125-26 (Cal. 2d Dist.
2006).
82. See generally Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 896 P.2d 776, 798
(Cal. 4th 1995); State v. Conforti, 688 So. 2d 350, 357-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist.
1997); In re Detention of D.A.H., 924 P.2d 49, 53-54 (Wash. Div. 1 1996).
83. See infra notes 85-92.
84. WING, supra note 61, at 285.
85. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974).
86. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o) et
seq. (1988).
87. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986).
88. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
89. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1938).
90. Health Research Extension Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1985).
91. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1944).
92. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, P.L.104-191, 42
U.S.C. 201 et seq. (42 U.S.C. 1320d-2) (1996).
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The diversity of this list should convey the complexity of the governing
legal authority in this area.
The Supreme Court has also spoken directly to the issue of medical
reporting law and created two general rules with regard to medical privacy
issues. First, the Supreme Court has held that there is a zone of privacy
between a patient and a physician. 93 Due process considerations protect the
interests of individuals in avoiding disclosure of their personal information
within this zone of privacy.94 Second, the Supreme Court has found that
when disclosure of information threatens the exercise of personal autonomy
rights, the court must review the state's purpose for infringing those rights
under a heightened level of scrutiny to determine if the government action is
warranted. 9
The issue in Whalen v. Roe, which is the key decision in the line of cases
that define a zone or privacy, was whether New York State could record the
names and addresses of each individual who filled a prescription for drugs
for which both legal and illegal markets exist.96 The Supreme Court held
that the state statute requiring disclosure of such identifying information did
not violate constitutional privacy rights. 97 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court recognized that "zones of privacy" do exist,98 but found that the
particular state program in question did not infringe on them. 99 In discussing
these "zones of privacy," the Court affirmed that this conception of privacy
included the two general categories of constitutional privacy rights noted
above-informational privacy and autonomy privacy.
93. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
94. Id.
95. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976); Thornburgh v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-66 (1986); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1992). It should be noted,
however, that federal courts disagree as to the level of scrutiny that this heightened
standard should accord. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79-81; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765-66;
Casey, 505 U.S. at 848-50.
96. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591.
97. Id. at 603-04.
98. Id. at 598.
99. Id. at 603-04.
100. Id. at 598-600.
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After recognizing these privacy interests, the Court went on to discuss the
state action taken by New York, specifically, and the concept of state action
with regard to public health and medical information, generally.' The
Court noted that the very nature of modem health care requires some
invasion of personal privacy, going so far as to recognize that mandatory
reporting requirements may be necessary in order to responsibly protect
public health.10 2 One passage of the Court's decision is especially blunt:
Unquestionably, some individuals' concern for their own privacy may
lead them to avoid or to postpone needed medical attention.
Nevertheless, disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to
hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health
agencies are often an essential part of modem medical practice even
when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the
patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State
having responsibility for the health of the community, does not
.... 103
automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy.
Although legal scholars have disagreed over the extent to which this
passage should rightfully be interpreted, the language speaks for itself.10 4 At
the very least, this statement stands for the proposition that there are times
when a state's interest in protecting the public health of its citizens can
outweigh an individual's interest in withholding certain personal information
from the government. 1
05
The second general rule that pertains to medical privacy rights is found in
another line of case, in which the Supreme Court has concluded that the
disclosure of private information requires a higher scrutiny over the
government action compelling the disclosure. °6 In Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, the Court struck down certain provisions of a Missouri state
statute that required spousal or parental consent before a pregnant woman
101. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600.
102. Id at 602.
103. Id.
104. WING, supra note 61, at 296.
105. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602.
106. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976);
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-66
(1986); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1992).
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could receive an abortion.' °7 Nevertheless, after examining the mandatory
reporting requirement of the statute, the Court concluded that this specific
provision was reasonable in pursuit of the state's interest in preserving
maternal health.
10 8
Ten years later, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of mandatory
reporting laws in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists.109  In this case, the Court struck down provisions of a
Pennsylvania statute that required medical practitioners to report abortions,
because this provision was not narrowly tailored to further the government's
interest in promoting the public health. 10  Referencing the Danforth
holding, the Court in Thornburgh stated that "the reports required under the
Act before us today go well beyond the health-related interests that served to
justify the Missouri reports under consideration in Danforth.""' Unlike the
law under review in Danforth, the Pennsylvania statute required reporting
information regarding the method of payment for the abortion and the
patient's personal medical history.112 The Supreme Court found that this
information was unnecessary in furthering a legitimate state concern for the
protection of public health.113
The Supreme Court visited the issue of medical notification again in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 114 another case that dealt with a Pennsylvania
abortion reporting law. 15 Although the Court ultimately struck down the
reporting requirement in this statute, due to a provision requiring that the
107. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52-53.
108. Id. at 80 (stating that "[r]ecordkeeping and reporting requirements that are
reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a
patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible").
109. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747-48.
110. Id. at 772.
111. Id. at 766.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
115. Id. at 844.
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woman seeking the abortion give a "reason for failure to provide notice to
her husband," 6 the Court found that the statute's requirement that other
information be reported did not violate a woman's privacy rights.
117
Referring to information regarding the performing physician, the facility, the
woman's age, the number of prior pregnancies and abortions, the type of
abortion procedure, the date of the abortion, the woman's pre-existing
medical conditions, and the weight of the aborted fetus, the Court noted that
the reporting requirement for this type of information was constitutionally
legitimate because it could help the state protect women's health. 118 The
Court stated that "collection of information with respect to actual patients is
a vital element of medical research, and so it cannot be said that the
requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortions more
difficult."1
19
While the Court has reached varying outcomes with regard to mandatory
reporting laws, depending on the specific facts of each situation, these cases
demonstrate how the Court uses a heightened standard or review in assessing
the constitutionality of statutes that may infringe on an individual's personal
autonomy. It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court has
reviewed mandatory reporting laws solely in the context of drug crimes and
abortion, and has not yet examined this issue with regard to contagious
diseases.' The principles laid down in these cases are certainly applicable
to mandatory reporting laws dealing with HIV/AIDS and other diseases or
conditions, but the Court has yet to address this issue explicitly.1 21
B. GOVERNMENTACTION TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH
The government has a duty to protect public health and an interest in
doing so.122 Although individuals have a personal right to privacy and
116. Id. at 901 (internal quotations omitted).
117. Id. at 900-01.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. WING, supra note 61, at 300.
121. Id.
122. See infra Section II1.B.
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autonomy, these interests can conflict with a state's efforts to protect the
health and welfare of its citizens, as evidenced by the cases examined in
Section III.A, above.' 23 This section will examine the issue of state action,
discussing the situations in which the federal and state governments can
lawfully infringe on individual privacy rights, and outlining what the
government action must look like if such interference occurs.
1. Federal Government Action
The federal government has a fundamental interest in protecting the health
of the American people and it can compel individuals to act, or not act, in
124certain ways in order to protect the common good. The United States
Constitution vests this power in the federal government. 125 There are two
sources of constitutional authority for such power-the General Welfare
Clause, found in the taxing and spending passage in Article 1, Section 8,126
and the Commerce Clause, an enumerated power also found in Article 1,
Section 8.127 These constitutional provisions give Congress the power and
authority to pass legislation protecting the general welfare of the American
people and to regulate interstate commerce, an area frequently affected by
public health policy. 128 Congress has consistently exercised its power to
pass laws governing public health under these two clauses since the early
days of this nation's history.
129
The General Welfare Clause states, "Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
123. See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
124. WING, supra note 61, at 328.
125. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See generally Wendy Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic
Doctrine, 14 HOFsTRA L. REv. 53 (1985).
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for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States...
The applicability and interpretation of this clause has been vigorously
debated by many of the greatest minds throughout American history.
31
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court lay to rest any disagreement that existed on
this matter in a 1936 decision. 132 After discussing the two different positions
on the interpretation of this clause, in United States v. Butler the Court stated
that the General Welfare Clause should be understood as an additional grant
of congressional power above and beyond the other enumerated powers
granted in Article 1, Section 8.133 The Court noted that the General Welfare
Clause, as interpreted, accords Congress "a substantive power to tax and to
appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to
provide for the general welfare of the United States."' 34 The Court later
noted that in pursuing the general welfare, Congress must adopt "general,
and not local" legislation.'
35
The Supreme Court revisited this issue a year later, in Helvering v.
Davis.136  This decision marks the Court's current interpretation of the
General Welfare Clause.1 37  In this case, the Court recognized that the
concept of general welfare can change depending on the circumstances in
which the nation finds itself. 38 The Court also noted that discretion to
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
131. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton were two of the most prominent thinkers who disagreed on this issue. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 65-67.
134. Id. at 65-66.
135. Id. at 66-67 (quoting Alexander Hamilton's Report on Manufactures).
136. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
137. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 567 (5th
ed. 2006).
138. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-41. "Nor is the concept of the general welfare static.
Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the
well-being of the Nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the times." Id.
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ascertain the general welfare sits with Congress.' 39 Therefore, courts can
only intervene when Congress has acted in a manner that "is clearly wrong,
a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment."'140 In these two
cases, the Supreme Court judged that the General Welfare Clause was itself
an independent grant of power and that Congress has the jurisdiction to
decide what spending or congressionally-permissible actions further the
general welfare. 14 1 Courts can review this decision, but must defer to
congressional action unless it is clearly arbitrary. 142 Thus, under the General
Welfare Clause, Congress can pass public health laws that involve a tax or
an allocation of federal funds.
14
In addition to the General Welfare Clause, Congress can also pass public
health laws under its authority to regulate interstate commerce. The
Commerce Clause, also found in Article 1, Section 8, states that "Congress
shall have the Power To ... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 144 Beginning with the
New Deal legislation, Congress began relying more heavily on the
Commerce Clause to justify its actions. Although the Supreme Court
addressed this issue numerous times, some of its recent decisions have
significantly clarified the extent and boundaries of Commerce Clause
jurisdiction. 146
139. Id. at 640.
140. Id. The Court went on to state that "When such a contention [regarding the
General Welfare Clause] comes here we naturally require a showing that by no
reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation fall within the wide range of
discretion permitted to the Congress." Id. at 641 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 67 (1936)).
141. See generally Butler, 297 U.S. at 1; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 619.
142. See generally Butler, 297 U.S. at 1; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 619.
143. Butler, 297 U.S. at 1; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 619.
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
145. See BREST, supra note 137, at 558-64.
146. See infra notes 147-69 and accompanying text.
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In United States v. Lopez, 147 the Supreme Court struck down a federal law
banning firearms in school-zones because it exceeded the constitutional
bounds of the Commerce Clause. 48 This five-to-four decision marked the
first time in almost sixty years that the Court struck down a federal law
under the Commerce Clause, but it is most noteworthy for the Court's
expostulation of three categories of commercial activities under which
Congress has the power to legislate.' 49 First, Congress can regulate "the use
of the channels of interstate commerce."' 15 Second, Congress can regulate
intrastate activities and actions that threaten "the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce.' 5 1 Third,
Congress can regulate "activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce." ' 152 As a result of this decision, all congressional action under
the Commerce Clause must fall into one of these three categories.
Five years later, the same Justices, in an identical five-to-four split as
Lopez, again invalidated congressional action under the Commerce Clause in
Morrison v. United States. IN In striking down part of the Violence Against
Women Act,' 54 the Court ruled that even though Congress had made
significant factual findings concerning the economic impact of gender
violence, simple factual-causation was insufficient to constitute a substantial
relationship to interstate commerce. 55 According to the Court, Congress
can only use the Commerce Clause to justify regulating actions that are truly
economic in nature. 56 The logical question arising from this decision is
147. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
148. Id. at 55l.
149. Id. at 558-59.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
153. Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
154. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322 (1994).
155. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-14.
156. Id. at 613.
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what constitutes "economic" activity. Federal courts have wrestled with this
issue, and have yet to articulate a clear answer.
157
The Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the Commerce Clause
to public health law in Gonzales v. Raich.158 In this case, the Court upheld a
federal ban on the cultivation and use of medical marijuana. 159 The Court
found that there was a rational basis for connecting medical marijuana with
interstate commerce.' According to the Court, leaving the regulation of
medicinal marijuana use to each state would impact the ability of the federal
government to combat the illicit use of drugs, which would have a
concurrent economic impact on the United States as a whole.
161
The Lopez, Morrison, and Raich decisions each dealt specifically with the
legitimacy of federal action under the Commerce Clause. However, the
Supreme Court has also found that state action is reviewable under the
Commerce Clause. This state-centric analysis-known as the "Dormant
Commerce Clause" analysis-seeks to determine whether a state law
wrongfully infringes on interstate commerce, thereby violating the
Commerce Clause. 2 In the 2007 decision United Haulers Association, Inc.
v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,163 the Courtaddressed the Dormant Commerce Clause implications of a New York state
157. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that Congress can
use the Commerce Clause to protect a species of endangered wolves due to the tourist
and scientific activity surrounding the endangered species); but see Gibbs, 214 F.3d at
506-10 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (arguing that the protection of a small population of an
isolated species was not "economic" in nature).
158. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
159. Id. at 33.
160. Id. at 22.
161. Id. at 29-30.
162. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 493 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating "a state law may violate the unwritten rules described as the
'dormant Commerce Clause' either by imposing an undue burden on both out-of-state
and local producers engaged in interstate activities or by treating out-of-state producers
less favorably than their local competitors").
163. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330 (2007).
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action designed to protect public health and local economic interests. 64 The
Court found that the local ordinance did not violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause, because it applied uniformly to all private ventures.1 65 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court stated that "we will uphold a nondiscriminatory
statute like this one unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."',
66
In following the holdings of these cases, Congress can pass public health
laws under the Commerce Clause, as long as they fall into one of the three
categories listed in Lopez and constitute "economic" activity under Morrison
and Raich. 67 Furthermore, federal Commerce Clause power preempts state
and local laws that have a substantial impact on interstate commerce if the
state burden on interstate commerce outweighs the local benefits of the
laws. 168 As evidenced by the number of court challenges on this issue,
Congress has routinely used the Commerce Clause to justify legislation on a
wide variety of issues, including public health.
169
The Constitution confers upon Congress the authority to regulate public
health under the General Welfare and Commerce Clauses. 170  It also
provides that any law Congress passes on public health issues, or any other
issue, preempts state or local law to the contrary. 17 The Supremacy Clause,
found in Article VI, states, "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."'' 72 Consequently, any legislation passed by Congress will
164. Id. at 330-33.
165. Id. at 346.
166. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
167. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Morrison v. United
States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
168. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338.
169. See supra notes 147-66 and accompanying text.
170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
171. Id. at art. VI.
172. Id.
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trump state and local laws, insofar as the nonfederal laws contradict the
federal legislation.
2. State Government Action
Even though the federal government has the power to pass legislation
governing public health, the individual states have the greatest amount of
jurisdiction to regulate this area.1 7 3  The states, unlike the federal
government, have the power and duty to protect the health, welfare, safety,
and morals of their citizens. 174 This power, often referred to as the "police
power,"'1 75 is limited only by the respective constitutions of each state,
essentially making it the most extensive and comprehensive power a state
has to regulate in these areas.176
The Supreme Court explicitly recognized the police power of each state in
the landmark 1905 decision Lochner v. New York. 177 In that decision, the
Court said:
There are... certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each State
in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers... [that] relate
to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public. Both
property and liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may be
imposed by the governing power of the State in the exercise of those
178powers.
As recognized by the Court, the states can make reasonable impositions
on the privacy and property rights of individuals in exercising police
powers. 179 Even though Lochner has been overturned on other grounds,
80
173. See infra notes 177-214 and accompanying text.
174. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
175. Id. at 53.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 53.
179. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53-54. The Court went on to state that personal rights to
privacy and property may sometimes conflict with the state's police power, and that the
interests of the individual must be weighed against the interests of the state in
determining the validity of the state's exercise of power:
Therefore, when the state, by its legislature, in the assumed exercise of its police
powers, has passed an act which seriously limits the right to labor or the right of
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the Lochner Court's construal of the states' power to preserve the health,
welfare, and morals of its citizens remains the current construction of the
police power in use today.
181
Although the police power cases decided during the Lochner Era
predominantly dealt with labor laws regulating minimum wage or the
number of work hours employers could demand of their employees, the
Supreme Court continued to recognize the states' legitimate interest in
protecting the public health.182 Even if the Court may rule differently as to
the validity of each state action in protecting the public health, such
preservation is one of the chief goals of a state's exercise of its police
power. 183
contract in regard to their means of livelihood between persons who are suijuris
(both employer and employee), it becomes of great importance to determine
which shall prevail-the right of the individual to labor for such time as he may
choose, or the right of the state to prevent the individual form laboring, or from
entering into any contract to labor, beyond a certain time prescribed by the state.
Id.
180. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parris, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (holding that a
state can legitimately exercise its police powers to restrict liberty of contract).
181. See generally Dodger's Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Johnson County Bd. of County
Com'rs, 32 F.3d 1436, 1441 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that the states "require no specific
grant of authority in the Federal Constitution to legislate with respect to matters
traditionally within the scope of the police power").
182. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57-58; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38
(1905). The Lochner Court stated that:
The mere assertion that the subject relates, though but in a remote
degree, to the public health, does not necessarily render the enactment
valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end,
and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act
can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an
individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in
relation to his own labor.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57-58.
183. Barsky v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954);
see also Lewis Food Co. v. State Dept. of Public Health, 243 P.2d 802, 804 (2d Dist.
1952); City of Kansas City v. Jordan, 174 S.W.3d 25, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2005).
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The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a state public health
law in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,184 decided the same year as Lochner. In
Jacobson, the Court analyzed a Massachusetts state law that allowed
municipalities to require vaccinations and to fine nonparticipants. 85 The
Court held that the Massachusetts law was enacted as a legitimate effort to
pursue public health, and that it is inherent in the police power of each state
to determine the steps necessary to promote the public health and general
welfare.1 86 In the course of its analysis, the Court expostulated a standard
for judicial review of public health laws. 187 The Court stated that public
health laws promulgated under the state police power must have a "real or
substantial relation to those [police power] objects" and must not impose
something that is, "beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights
secured by" the United States Constitution.
184. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
185. Id. at 12.
186. Id. at 38 (stating that "[t]he safety and the health of the people of Massachusetts
are, in the first instance, for the Commonwealth to guard and protect . . . we do not
perceive that this legislation has invaded any right secured by the Federal Constitution").
187. Id. at 28.
188. According to the Supreme Court in Jacobson, legitimate government action to
protect the public health must fall within certain constitutional limitations. First,
government action must be reasonably connected to the end it is designed to achieve.
The Court in Jacobson stated that "it might be that an acknowledged power of a local
community to protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all might be
exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an
arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required
for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the
protection of such persons." Id. Second, the government action cannot patently invade a
constitutional right. Id at 31. The type of constitutional violation the Court envisioned
here was more than a mere weighing of constitutional interests, but a clear violation of an
explicit, inalienable constitutional right. Id. at 31-32. Third, the Court found that the
actual existence of the danger the government action sought to avert was an additional
factor that should be considered in support of a determination of constitutionality of the
government's action. Id. at 27. Finally, any action by a state government is legitimate
only insofar as it does not conflict with a federal law on the issue. Id. at 25. The Court
revisited the limits on government action the same year it decided Jacobson. In Lochner,
the Court noted that state government police power action must also be weighed against
other constitutional considerations to determine whether the action is reasonable, whether
it is necessary, and whether it arbitrarily interferences with personal liberty and privacy.
2010
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Subsequent decisions have followed Jacobson for the proposition that the
judiciary should show great deference to the findings of state legislatures
that a particular infringing action is necessary to support public health.1 89
For this reason, Jacobson is considered by many to be the most important
decision in public health law.' 90  As demonstrated in the following
examples, states have exercised their police power to regulate public health
by examining, quarantining, and, at times, involuntarily treating
individuals.'
9 1
Throughout American history, states have acted to protect the public
health of their citizens.' 92 Some of these efforts have been more extreme
than others, ranging from mere education about communicable diseases to
quarantine of those with infectious diseases.' 93 While quarantine may seem
unnecessarily extreme, there is a long history of its use in the United
The Lochner Court summarized the balancing between government interest and personal
constitutional rights as follows:
In every case that comes before this court, therefore, where legislation of this
character is concerned and where the protection of the Federal Constitution is
sought, the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate
exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary
and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty
or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him
appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family?
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
Since Jacobson and Lochner, courts have distilled these requirements on government
action into the general rule that any government remedy must be adopted in the least
intrusive manner reasonably possible. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see also
WING, supra note 61, at 190.
189. WING, supra note 61, at 68-69.
190. Id. at 59 (stating "Jacobson is widely regarded as the seminal decision in
American public health law, largely because it upholds the constitutional validity of the
state's curtailment of individual liberty in the interests of public health").
191. Jd. at 69.
192. Parmet, supra note 129, at 55-71.
193. See id at 56.
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States, 194 and the Supreme Court has sanctioned it as a legitimate public
health power since the early-1800s. 195 Quarantine is just one example of
deliberate state action taken to protect the general well-being and health of
the citizenry. Since these early attempts at protecting the public health,
states have taken a variety of approaches in this area.
Surveillance laws are one of the most commonly utilized state efforts for
protecting public health. 196 Currently, every state has some form of public
health reporting laws.' 97  These laws generally require certain medical
personnel to report to the state cases of infectious disease. 198 Which diseases
physicians must report vary by state, but the CDC provides a recommended
list of communicable diseases that should be reported when encountered. 199
Although this list is only a recommendation, it is highly influential and
carries great weight.200 HIV/A1DS, along with other sexually-transmitted
infections, are on the CDC list.
20 1
As noted above, public health surveillance is one of the foundations of
202modem health °. Because reporting requirements are so fundamental to the
protection of the common good, most physicians accept their necessity,
203
albeit with certain reasonable constraints. As health sciences have
194. Massachusetts passed a law establishing quarantine to combat the spread of
infection in 1797. Act of June 22, 1797, ch. 16 GEN. LAWS OF MASS. (1822).
195. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
196. WING, supra note 61, at 283.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. CDC, HHS, NATIONALLY NOTIFIABLE INFECTIOUS DISEASES, UNITED STATES
2006, http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/infdis2006.htm (last visited April 9,
20 10) [hereinafter NATIONALLY NOTIFIABLE INFECTIOUS DISEASES].
200. WING, supra note 61, at 311.
201. NATIONALLY NOTIFIABLE INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supra note 199.
202. Ruth L. Berkelman et al., Public Health Surveillance, in 2 OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF
PUBLIC HEALTH 759, 759-60 (Roger Detels et al., eds., 4th ed. 2002).
203. WING, supra note 61, at 310.
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advanced, the way in which public health surveillance has been used has
also progressed.2 °  Instead of subjecting those testing positive for a disease
on a state's watch-list to mandatory isolation, this information is now used to
recommend treatment and other remedies based on the specific condition of
the infected patient.
20 5
Traditionally, states required personal information as part of disease
surveillance.206 This information was collected in case the state needed to
take quarantine actions against the individual in order to prevent an
epidemic. 20 7  While modem health care has rendered such fears largely
irrelevant, when there is danger of a rapid spread of infection, personal
information is critical in order for the state to protect the citizens at large.
208
As HIV/AIDS became more prevalent in the early-1980s, states began
considering whether to require personal information in the reporting of
HIV/AIDS cases.209 Due to the limited medical information available at that
time regarding HIV/AIDS transmission, and the fact that there was no
effective treatment for the disease, many states found that it was unnecessary
to equate HIV/AIDS with other communicable diseases and chose not to
require that the reports contain personal information or that patients be
210
effectively isolated for life. States were also concerned that if they
required personal information, individuals would not seek testing for fear of
negative reprisals with regard to their employment, health insurance, or life
insurance.2 1  If these individuals did not seek testing, then there was a
danger that infected persons might inadvertently transmit their disease to
others, without knowing their own condition.2 12 Today, however, there is
204. Id. at 311.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 321.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. WING, supra note 61, at 321.
210. Id. at 321-22.
211. Id. at 322.
212. Id.; Note also that the Institute of Medicine has provided an excellent summary
of the issue of HIV/AIDS reporting:
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effective treatment that reduces suffering, prolongs life, and reduces
transmission.213
3. Limits on Government Action
As noted above, both federal and state governments have the legal
authority to regulate public health. This power is not without limits,
however. The government interest in protecting the health of its citizens
must be balanced with the individual's interest in privacy and autonomy.
2 14
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution require federal
and state governments to abide by the due process of law whenever taking
action that deprives individuals of their life, liberty, or property.
Constitutional due process issues involve two considerations-procedural
216due process and substantive due process. 6 Procedural due process
Public health authorities justified reporting of HIV infection on several grounds.
Reporting would alert public health officials to the presence of individuals with
a lethal infection; would allow officials to counsel them about what they needed
to do to prevent further transmission; would assure the linkage of infected
persons with medical and other services; and would permit authorities to
monitor the incidence and prevalence of infection. In the following years, CDC
continued to press for name-based reporting of HIV cases, supported by a
growing number of public health officials. Indeed, the Council of State and
Territorial Epidemiologists adopted several resolutions between 1989 and 1995
recommending and encouraging that states consider the implementation of HIV
case reporting by name. Political resistance persisted however, and HIV cases
typically became reportable by name only in states that did not have large
cosmopolitan communities with effectively organized gay constituencies or
high AIDS caseloads. By 1996, although 26 states had adopted HIV case
reporting, they represented jurisdictions with only approximately a quarter of
total reported AIDS cases. By October 1998, name-based reporting had a
stronger foothold with 32 states then reporting cases of HIV by name, although
three states reported only pediatric cases.
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEASURING WHAT MATTERS: ALLOCATION, PLANNING, AND
QUALITY ASSESSMENT FOR THE RYAN WHITE CARE ACT 78 (2004) (internal citations
omitted) [hereinafter MEASURING WHAT MATTERS].
213. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
215. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
216. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 545
(2006).
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examines whether the government employs proper procedures in
implementing the government action. 217 Substantive due process analyzes
whether the government action, itself, is legitimate.
218
The text of the Due Process Clause states that "[n]o person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' 2 9 At its
most basic level, the text indicates that a procedural due process analysis
involves three inquiries: Was there a deprivation? If so, did the deprivation
involve a right to life, liberty, or property? Finally, was there due process of
law involved in the deprivation? 22° For most public health cases of the
nature discussed in this article, government action will deprive people of
liberty.221 As a result, the third question noted above is key for a procedural
due process analysis of this nature. 222 When analyzing what process is
"due" in deprivations of civil liberties, courts have balanced the interests of
the government with the infringements on individual liberty.
223
The Supreme Court provided a model for procedural due process analyses
224in Mathews v. Eldridge. In that decision, the Court outlined three
questions that are integral to a procedural due process analysis. First, a court
must ascertain what private interest will be affected by the government
action.225 Second, the court must assess the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of that interest through the procedure used by the government, and must
analyze the probative value additional procedural safeguards would add.226
Third, the court must weigh these private interests with the government's
217. Id. at 545-57.
218. Id. at 547-549.
219. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
220. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 216, at 545-57.
221. WING, supra note 61, at 165.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 166.
224. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
225. Id. at 335.
226. Id.
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interest in making the deprivation of liberty.227 Though complex, the main
purpose of this three-part test is to weigh the procedural fairness of the
government action.228
Substantive due process deals with the nature of the government action.
Again, as with procedural due process, courts employ a balancing test to
determine whether the government has a valid reason for infringing on
individual liberty. 229 In ascertaining how to balance government interest
with personal liberties, courts use two different levels of scrutiny, depending
on the nature of the rights being infringed by the government-rational basis
scrutiny and strict scrutiny. Rational basis scrutiny applies to all
government actions that infringe on an individual's right to life, liberty, or
property. 23 When analyzing government action under this level of scrutiny,
courts ascertain whether the government action is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose.232  This threshold is not particularly
onerous, and the government generally meets this standard, so long as the
liberty-infringing action has a reasonable connection to the proposed
governmental purpose. 233  Whenever the government action infringes a
fundamental right,234 however, courts apply a strict scrutiny standard to the
227. Id. The Court stated the three-part test as follows:
[Ildentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probative value if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id.
228. WING, supra note 61, at 167.
229. Id.
230. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 216, at 539-43.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Lawrence v. Texas recognized the contemporary understanding of fundamental
rights as those which are rooted in the history of the United States, stating
"only fundamental rights which are deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition
2010
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government action.235 Under this analysis, courts will only deem the
government action constitutionally permissible if it is necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose, and if it is the least restrictive means of
meeting that purpose.236
In making a substantive due process analysis, a court must first ascertain
what is the precise state interest, and then weigh that interest against its
infringement on life, liberty, or property. 237 If the rights being violated by
the action are deemed fundamental, then the court must apply a strict
scrutiny standard and seek to determine whether the action is the least
restrictive means of accomplishing the government purpose. 238 If the rights
do not rise to this heightened level, then the court only needs to determine
whether the government action is rationally related to a legitimate purpose to
hold that the action is permissible.239 Any government action, be it federal
or state, must abide by these Due Process Clause restrictions.
C. Analysis-Is this Solution Legally Defensible?
As Professor Ruth Berkelman, the Director of the Center for Public Health
Preparedness and Research at Emory University, has observed, "[p]ublic
health surveillance is the epidemiological foundation for modem public
health., 240 Contemporary health problems can only be dealt with effectively
when the government has information about the character, extent, and
rapidity of the spread of the disease. 241 The preceding discussions have
demonstrated the compelling interest the government has in protecting the
public from an HIV/AIDS epidemic. Previous government efforts to address
qualify for anything other than rational-basis scrutiny under the doctrine of substantive
due process." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003); see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 216, at 794-96.
235. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 216, at 539-43.
236. Id.; see also WING, supra note 61, at 167-69.
237. WNG, supra note 61, at 167-68.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Berkelman, supra note 202, at 759.
241. Id. at 759-61.
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the HIV/AIDS problem have been met with only marginal success. 24 2 In
order to effectively combat the increasing transmission of HIV/AIDS in the
United States, the government must institute a broad testing, treatment, and
education program aimed at accurately ascertaining (to the extent possible)
who is infected, effectively treating those with the disease to reduce the
transmission rate and increase the comfort of the infected individual, and
consistently and repeatedly educating infected persons and the public as to
the nature of the disease and ways to avoid contracting it.243  The
government has a specific interest in implementing these efforts in order to
protect the public health from the spread of HIV/AIDS.
In the past, the federal and state governments have pursued extreme
actions to protect the common good. Recognizing the government's
responsibility to protect citizens generally, many courts have upheld
government actions that incidentally infringe upon personal liberty and
245privacy because they were in furtherance of the public health. With
regard to state action involving mandatory testing, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that confidential disease testing did not violate the
privacy rights of individuals because the state demonstrated that there was a
compelling need for such information.246  Furthermore, public health
specialists have recognized that public health surveillance is based,
242. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text. The District of Columbia recently
adopted a new HIV/AIDS response. In collaborating with the National Institutes of
Health, the Washington, D.C. government has instituted a study to measure how effective
a test-and-treat program will be in combating new instances of the disease. As well
intentioned as this program may be, it is missing the education prong, which is a critically
important step in combating the spread of HIV/AIDS. It is hard to say what the ultimate
result of this program will be, as the effects may take years and years to become
quantifiable. Darryl Fears, District, NIH Announce New Initiative Aimed at HIV/AIDS
Epidemic, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/01/ 12/AR2010011203163pf.html.
243. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
244. Quarantine and mandatory vaccination are just two examples of government
action, deemed lawful by the courts, that have severely limited personal freedom and
infringed on individual privacy rights. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
245. See supra Section III.B.
246. ACT-UP Triangle v. Comm'n for Health Servs. of North Carolina, 483 S.E.2d
388, 394-95 (N.C. 1997).
2010
The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXVI:2
fundamentally, on the concept that individuals may be required to act or not
act in a particular way, for the benefit of those around them.
247
Additionally, the government may also have an interest in the actual
248identity of those tested. As noted above, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
the Supreme Court held that certain personal information obtained from
actual patients is a necessary part of medical research, and, as such,
disclosing the identities of such individuals to the government can serve a
useful, important purpose. 2 49 In 1998, the Alabama Supreme Court applied
this reasoning to mandatory HIV/AIDS reporting, when it held that the state
had a compelling interest in the identities of the individuals tested.
250
As of 2004, every state and territory in America had a confidential HIV
reporting requirement. 251  While AIDS reporting generally utilizes a
standard name-based system, states have adopted varied methods for HIV
reporting. 252  Approximately two-thirds of states and territories use
confidential, name-based systems for HIV reporting, similar to those used
for other communicable diseases, while the rest use different methods to
protect the confidentiality of the reported information. 253  What is most
important for this discussion, however, is the fact that the vast majority of
states and territories require the reporting of identities (which are then kept
in confidence) in addition to mere instances of infection, while only state,
New Hampshire, offers a completely anonymous option where no
254identifying patient information is collected.
247. Amy L. Fairchild, Dealing with Humpty Dumpty: Research, Practice and the
Ethics of Public Health Surveillance 31 J.L. MED. & ETHics 615, 615 (2003) (stating that
"individuals may be compelled to do or not do things to protect the common good").
248. See Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
249. Id. at 900-01.
250. Middlebrooks v. State Bd. of Health, 710 So.2d 891 (Ala. 1998) (finding that it is
within the state's jurisdiction to compel individual physicians to disclose the identities of
their patients with HIV/AIDS).
251. MEASURING WHAT MATTERS, supra note 212, at 78.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 78-79. For an excellent overview of the history of named reporting for
HIV/AIDS in the United States, see Kevin M. Kramer, A National Epidemic, A National
Learning from History
So, is the proposed public health response to HIV/AIDS advocated in this
article legally defensible? As noted in Roe v. Wade, whenever individual
privacy and autonomy rights are implicated, the infringing government
action warrants heightened scrutiny. 25 However, there is a convoluted
history of government action that has constitutionally infringed on personal
rights.256 For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, the Supreme
Court upheld mandatory reporting laws that infringed on individual privacy
interests.257  Conversely, in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Supreme Court struck down a
mandatory reporting law because it required the submission of payment
methods and personal medical history, but noted that the reporting of other
types of information, relevant to the government interest in protecting public
health, did not violate individual constitutional rights to privacy and
autonomy. 258 Finally, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court
provided a list of specific types of information, the reporting of which would
not violate privacy rights.
The federal and state governments can regulate public health in ways that
infringe on personal rights or liberties. The basis for the federal
government's authority in this area is found in the General Welfare and
Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. 26 The Supreme Court
has interpreted the General Welfare Clause to be an independent grant of
legislative power within the taxing and spending authority found in the text
of the clause.26' The Court has further noted that Congress has jurisdiction
to determine what the general welfare is, a decision that courts can only
Conversation, A National Law: In Support of Unique Identifier Reporting for HIV
Surveillance, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 173, 182-90 (1999).
255. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
256. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976); Thornburgh v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-66 (1986); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1992).
257. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79-81.
258. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765-66.
259. Casey, 505 U.S. at 900.
260. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
261. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
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overrule if it is clearly arbitrary and unfounded.262 Additionally, Congress
can pass public health laws under its Commerce Clause jurisdiction, so long
as the action falls within one of the three categories the Supreme Court
identified in Lopez,263 and is "economic" in nature.26 Congress has used the
Commerce Clause as a basis for passing public health laws in the past, and
the Supreme Court has upheld this justification for those laws. 265 The state
governments can regulate public health under their police power jurisdiction
to protect the health, welfare, and morals of their citizens. According to the
Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, a state exercise of its police
power is legitimate so long as the government interest is directly related to
the infringement on personal rights, and so long as the government action is
not a "plain, palpable invasion" of a constitutional right.
However, when government action infringes on personal liberties, Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment due process considerations are implicated.
According to Supreme Court precedent in the Mathews decision, procedural
due process rights are maintained when the process used by the government
is fair in light of the private interest that the government action violates.
267
Additionally, in order to comport with substantive due process, government
action that infringes on personal privacy rights must satisfy strict scrutiny.2
68
Under this level of scrutiny, government action is constitutional if the action
is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest and the action
chosen by the government is the least restrictive means of meeting that
interest.26
9
The public health response to HIV/AIDS proposed in this article would
fall well within these legal boundaries. As demonstrated above, the
262. Id. at 645.
263. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
264. Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 29-30 (2005).
265. Raich, 545 U.S. at 29-30.
266. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905).
267. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
268. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 216, at 638-746.
269. Id.; WING, supra note 61, at 167-69; see also Kramer, supra note 254, at 200-01.
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government has a compelling interest in protecting the public health from
the continued spread of HIV/AIDS. Requiring widespread testing,
treatment, and education would directly support this public health interest.
The public health response to the syphilis epidemic of the early twentieth
century, as well as court decisions that have upheld similar government
action, demonstrate that a government requirement of mandatory testing,
treatment, and education of the nature prescribed in this article is
constitutionally permissible. 27  Such action falls within the federal
government's General Welfare and Commerce Clause powers, as well as
the state governments' police powers.272 Government action of this nature
would directly serve the government's interest in protecting the public
health, and would, as a result, outweigh any privacy rights on which it may
infringe. In fact, the proposed action in this article imposes no additional
privacy impositions beyond the status quo. All states, except New
Hampshire, require medical practitioners to report patient names for newly
diagnosed AIDS cases,273 but none of these states have any mandated action
as a consequence of these results.274 The proposal in this article would use
this type of information in a more pointed, intentional effort at reducing
HIV/AIDS transmission rates, helping those who are infected ascertain their
270. The National Venereal Disease Control Act of 1938 mandated counseling,
education, and treatment, much to the same extent as the proposal in this Article. The
Act incentivized these actions at a state level by making federal funding for venereal
disease treatment contingent on such counseling and education programs. National
Venereal Disease Control Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-540, 52 Stat. 439, 439-40 (1938).
271. Because this proposed action would involve federal spending, both the General
Welfare Clause and the Commerce Clause would justify the proposed action.
272. While outside the scope of this Article, it should be mentioned here that some
states have taken criminal actions against individuals infected with HIV/AIDS who
knowingly had unprotected sex with others, and have enacted statutes criminalizing
actions likely to result in the transmission of a sexually transmitted disease, such as
HIV/AIDS. It will be interesting to observe the interpretation courts give to these statutes
as HIV/AIDS treatments drastically reduce the circulatory viral load, lowering the
possibility of transmission to a virtual nullity. See J. Kelly Strader, Criminalization as a
Policy Response to a Public Health Crisis, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 435, 438-40 (1994).
273. MEASURING WHAT MATTERS, supra note 212, at 78-79.
274. Mandatory reporting is just one small step out of many. Reporting, alone, makes
an individual a statistic-it does not take the necessary, logical actions in response to
such statistical information.
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status so that they can receive treatment, thereby reducing the transmission
of the disease to those who are not currently infected.
IV. How To ACCOMPLISH THIS TYPE OF RESPONSE
A. Legal Issues
In analyzing the legal methods of accomplishing this proposal, the
threshold question is whether federal or state government should take the
lead on this public health response. There are benefits and detriments to
either option, but a federal response would be ideal, for the following
reasons. While it may be harder to garner the political will to institute and
fund a program of national proportions, a federal response would be uniform
in all jurisdictions. State responses would be tailored to the specific needs of
more-localized communities, but in order to truly accomplish the proposal in
this article, each state would have to act in the exact manner prescribed here.
The probability of fifty states passing laws that meet all the suggestions of
this article is slim. Additionally, if this proposal is accomplished state-by-
state, then state legislation and regulation would be subject to the respective
state constitutions, which are often much more protective of privacy rights
275than the United States Constitution. This is especially true with regard to
medical information. 276 If even one state does not meet these suggestions,
then the delinquent state could act as a pool of higher infection prevalence,
which would then undermine the efforts of the other states in combating the
spread of HIV/AIDS.277
275. See In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 604 N.E.2d 929, 934 (Ill. 1992)
(stating that "the Illinois Constitution goes beyond Federal constitutional guarantees by
expressly recognizing a zone of personal privacy"); Favalora v. Sidaway, 996 So. 2d 895,
899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that "Article I, section 23, Florida Constitution,
affords Floridians the right of privacy and ensures that each person has the right to
determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others") (internal citations omitted); see also People v. Givens, 892
N.E.2d 1098, 1107 (Ill. 1st Dist. 2008); State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d
577, 581 (Alaska 2007); State v. Ellis, 210 P.3d 144, 148 (Mont. 2009); In re Carmen M.,
46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 125-26 (Cal. 2d Dist. 2006).
276. See Universal City Dev. v. Williams, 963 So. 2d 351, 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th
Dist. 2007).
277. Another danger with the state-by-state response is that infected persons may fall
between the cracks, so to speak, since persons are mobile. An individual may avoid
testing and treatment, intentionally or unintentionally, by moving between states and
seeking medical attention in a disparate geographical area.
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This question of federalism aside, the proposals in this article could be
accomplished through legislation or the actions of an administrative agency,
at the federal or state level. As demonstrated by the Social Security Act of
1935,278 the National Venereal Disease Control Act of 1938,279 and the Ryan
White Care Act,280 responses to HIV/AIDS and other contagious diseases
have traditionally been regulated through legislation. A legislative response
embodying the proposals of this article would be preferable to an
administrative response, because a discreet statute dealing specifically with
this issue is more likely to address all the necessary considerations, such as
funding, scope (including an anti-discrimination protection statute),
administrative oversight, judicial review, and guidance on legal
interpretation. Implementation of this proposal by an agency, such as HHS
or a state equivalent, could be successful, but individuals would have more
grounds on which to challenge agency action than they would for
281challenging a statute. For this reason, in implementing the
recommendations of this article, a legislative response would be preferable
to an administrative response.
Therefore, the ideal method of government implementation of these
recommendations would be federal legislation. Federal legislation would
provide the greatest uniformity, coverage, funding, and legitimacy of any
possible government response. Furthermore, the United States has a
tradition of federal legislation regarding HIV/AIDS issues. While Congress
faces a hugely disparate gulf of political will on contentious issues-and
HIV/AIDS regulation is certainly a contentious issue-federal legislators
also have national public policy concerns in mind when deciding how to
vote, and as demonstrated above, the current public health response to
HIV/AIDS is sorely lacking.
278. Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, 635 (1935).
279. National Venereal Disease Control Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 439 (1938).
280. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576.
281. For example, challenges to agency action can include such issues as whether the
agency action comports with the agency's forming statute, whether the action is arbitrary
and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, and whether the action followed
the proper procedures, such as the sufficiency of the comment period, the adequacy of the
agency's reliance on expert testimony, and the compliance of the agency's action with
other controlling statutes. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.
(2006).
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B. Practical Issues
There are two practical issues implicated by the recommendations
provided in this article that have yet to be discussed. The first involves the
funding for this proposed response to HIV/AIDS and the second deals with
the pragmatic implementation of the strategic test-treat-educate public health
plan proposed here.
One of the first questions that is sure to confront a legislative
implementation of this recommendation is how it will be funded. In order
for this test-treat-educate response to be effective, the government needs to
provide the necessary funding to get the response off the ground and to
ensure its viability. There is a long tradition of federal funding of
HIV/AIDS research and public health programs. 282  Currently, federal
funding plays a huge role in driving both federal and state programs, 283 as
well as incentivizing additional state actions to promote HIV/AIDS research
and treatment.28 4 An additional, critical reason why federal funding for this
HIV/AIDS response is necessary is that any cost defrayed onto the infected
individual will undermine the efficacy of universal testing, treatment, and
285education.
While the public cost of such universal funding for HIV/AIDS testing,
treatment, and education (between $21,500 to $32,000 per patient per year)
seems staggering, 286 over time, the model recommended here would actually
282. MEASURING WHAT MATTERS, supra note 212, at 241-46; WING, supra note 61, at
324.
283. MEASURING WHAT MATTERS, supra note 212, at 241-46.
284. Id. at 73-85.
285. Jim Kim & Paul Farmer, AIDS in 2006-Moving Toward One World, One
Hope?, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 645 (2006). According to a recent article in the New
England Journal of Medicine:
The first lesson is that charging for AIDS prevention and care will pose
insurmountable problems for people living in poverty, since there will always
be those unable to pay even modest amounts for services or medications,
whether generic or branded. Like efforts to battle airborne tuberculosis, such
services should be seen as a public good for public health. Policymakers and
public health officials, especially in heavily burdened regions, should adopt
universal access plans and waive fees for HIV care.
Id.
286. For example, just considering the costs of anti-retroviral drugs, the cost of the
commonly used antiviral drug Atripla costs approximately $59 per day, and another
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save the government money. The federal government is already pouring
huge sums of money into HIV/AIDS care and treatment. 287 The proposed
response in this article would have a high up-front cost, but the ensuing
reduction of the HIV/AIDS infection rate would save significant amounts of
money in the long run. 288 By making a large initial commitment of funds,
the federal government can ultimately save money by outlaying less and less
for HIV/AIDS treatment as the transmission rate decreases, accordingly.
The second issue implicated here is how to incentivize this type of a
response to the general public. As the Supreme Court noted in Whalen,
individuals may avoid treatment in order to avoid reporting personal
information to the government. 289 However, given the positive impact of
treatment on longevity and quality of life of the infected person, such a
personal decision may seem irrational. Nevertheless, the fact remains that
the government will need to incentivize compliance by covering the cost of
care and treatment, or punish noncompliance with this proposed response.
In short, if the federal government passes legislation implementing this
strategic proposal, the statute will need to include some type of incentive for
compliance and penalty for noncompliance. The specifics of such
incentivization and penalization lie in the hands of policymakers, but such a
response requires consideration of these issues.
290
commonly used combination of atazanivir or darunavir, retonovir, tenofovir, and
emticitabrine would cost approximately $83 per day, or between $21,500 to $32,000 per
year. Telephone interview with NIH Pharmacy Staff, in Bethesda, Md. (April 2010);
RED BOOK: PHARMACY'S FUNDAMENTAL REFERENCE (1 13th ed. 2009).
287. MEASURING WHAT MATTERS, supra note 212, at 241-46.
288. The bottom line is that by reducing the incidence and prevalence of HIV/AIDS,
after a few years the costs of this strategic intervention will drastically drop, even below
the current spending levels. For example, reducing the present-day prevalence of
approximately 1.1 million cases by 25% would save approximately $7 billion per year in
drug costs, a 50% drop would save $14 billion, and a 75% drop would save $21 billion,
based on drug cost estimates alone. Telephone interview with NIH Pharmacy Staff, in
Bethesda, Md. (April 2010); RED BOOK: PHARMACY'S FUNDAMENTAL REFERENCE (113th
ed. 2009).
289. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
290. This incentivization issue is not new. Judge Simons noted in Axelrod that
placement of a disease on a communicable or sexually transmitted disease list may
trigger mandatory testing. State Society of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 608
(N.Y. 1991). Currently, the CDC recommends that HIV/AIDS should be reported.
NATIONALLY NOTIFIABLE INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supra note 199. Such mandatory testing
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V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Today, over 1.2 million individuals in the United States are living with
HIV/AIDS, 291 and over 55,000 more join their number each year.292 These
numbers speak for themselves-the current public health response to this
controllable disease is insufficient. Something different needs to be done.
The public health response to syphilis, spearheaded by Dr. Parran in the
1930s and 1940s, provides a ready example of a public health response to a
293disease with the same transmission and infection patterns as HIV/AIDS.
By modeling the current public health response to HIV/AIDS after the
successful response to syphilis, the transmission and new incidences of
HIV/AIDS will be reduced to negligible levels.
294
All three elements of this response-testing, treatment, and education-
are equally important. 295 Widespread testing will provide more reliable data
on infection rates and tendencies, providing the foundation for better
296treatment and more effective education. Free treatment for those who test
positive for HIV/AIDS is also critical, as this reduces the likelihood of
transmission to non-infected third parties and improves the quality and
longevity of life for those infected.297 The final step in this response is a
comprehensive education program focused on counseling those who are
infected, informing the general public how to avoid contracting and
spreading HIV/AIDS, and enlisting the conviction of the medical
profession.
298
and reporting has a long public-health pedigree, having been implemented by the
government in response to diseases such as syphilis, gonorrhea, and canchroid, just to
name a few. WING, supra note 61, at 310.
291. HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 9.
292. Id.
293. See supra Section I.
294. See supra Section II.
295. See supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
Learning from History
While the response proposed in this article may require some slight
burdens on individual privacy and autonomy rights, these burdens are legally
necessary to reach the greater common good when weighed against the
government's compelling interest in protecting the public health from the
spread of HIV/AIDS. 299 There is a long history in the United States of
government action that incidentally infringes on personal rights in order to
benefit the public health. 300 The law, as it currently stands, would support
government action to implement the proposals in this article.
30 1
As promising as this response may sound, a test-treat-educate approach to
HIV/AIDS will offer no better results than any one of the myriad other
programs the government has instituted over the years unless all sectors of
society join together behind such a response. Policymakers, medical
personnel, support staff, bureaucrats, infected populations, and interest
groups must al! look to the general public health benefits served by this
proposal.
299. See supra Section III.C.
300. See supra Section 111.B.
301. See supra Section III.C.
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